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We present a study on  Computaonal Metaphysics: a computer-assisted assessment of
Lowe’s ontological argument [2] using the interacve theorem prover Isabelle. Our approach
builds  on previous  work  on  the semanc  embedding of  quan$ed mul-modal  logics  in
classical  higher-order  logic  (Isabelle/HOL)  [1].  By  discussing  two  (of  several  possible)
formalizaon alternaves for this argument, we highlight the ambiguies of natural-language
argumentaon  and  present  a  case  study  for  the  adopon  of  computer-supported
argumentaon in philosophy.
We show how the praccal  bene$ts of  Automated Theorem Proving (ATP)  go beyond
mere quantave aspects (easier, faster and more reliable proofs). The advantages of ATP
are also qualitave, since a di.erent, holisc approach to argumentaon is fostered: We can
work iteravely on an argument by $xing truth-values and inferenal relaonships among its
sentences, choosing a logic for formalizaon, and then working back and forth on its axioms
and theorems by making gradual adjustments while ge1ng automac feedback about the
suitability of our speculaons.  We engage in this way in a deliberave process where we
progressively shed light on the meanings of words and sentences (cf.  semanc holism) and
connuously  revise  our  beliefs  and  commitments  unl  arriving  at  a  state  of  re&ecve
equilibrium: A  state  where  our  beliefs  have  the  highest  degree  of  coherence  and
acceptability.
Our  $ndings,  regarding  Lowe’s  ontological  argument,  include  the  need  for  addional
essenalist assumpons in the modal variant, and the possibility of a non-modal, $rst-order
interpretaon of this argument, movated by a simpli$ed, literal reading of its premises and
conclusion.  In  both formalizaons only a  subset  of  Lowe’s  premises has been needed to
jusfy the conclusion (the existence of a necessary concrete being). Moreover, we were able
to demonstrate premises’ consistency for all di.erent variants.
The work presented here originates from the Computaonal Metaphysics  lecture course
held at the FU Berlin in Summer 2016. In this course we pioneered the computer-assisted,
deep logical assessment of raonal philosophical arguments in the classroom.
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